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CLAIMS PROVABLE IN RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS.
Although the power of the English Court of Chancery to appoint
receivers is "one of the oldest remedies" of that Court' and although
some of the most important questions arising in the whole field of com-
mercial law concern the liquidation of insolvent corporations by
receivers, many portions of the law of receivers remain curiously unset-
tled. This is particularly so as to the question of claims provable
against the assets in the hands of a receiver. Thus in Connecticut the
Aetna Indemnity Company has been in process of liquidation by
receivers since early in 1911, but it is only now that the law has been
partially settled by two recent decisions in these proceedings: Bashford-
Burmister Company v. Aetna Indemnity Company (1919, Conn.) 105
At. 470; Husbands v. Aetna Indemnity Company (1919, Conn.) 105
Atl. 480.2
'Giffard, V. C. in Hopkins v. Worcester, etc. Canal Co. (1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 437,
447; I Clark Receivers (1918) sec. 4." For complete statement of facts, see RECENT CASE NoTEs, infra. In addition
to the points herein discussed, other interesting questions arose. Thus the
claimants were held to have been excused from presenting their claims within




These cases deal with two very important questions: (i) within what
time must claims mature in order to be provable in the receivership
proceedings and share in the dividend from the assets held by the
receiver? and (2) what constitutes a matured claim as distinguished
from a contingent claim?
The rules recently announced in New York have influenced the course
of decisions in Connecticut. In the first of a series of cases the New
York Court of Appeals held that claims, to share in the dividend, must
have matured at the time of the commencement of the action in which
the receiver is appointed; and that a claim against a surety on a
bond given in substitution of an attachment in a suit where judgment
was not obtained until after the receiver's appointment, was contingent
and could not share in the dividend.3 Next it held, though with a vig-
orous dissenting opinion, that claims under the United States Statute,
of unpaid materialmen against the surety on the bond of the contractor
for government works and improvements, were contingent, judgment
not having been secured prior to the receivership in the federal court
specified in the statute.4
Subsequent to these decisions the lower courts in Connecticut adopted
the New York rule for the Aetna Receivership, and this rule was
applied against many claims in this receivership, until it has now been
at least partially set aside by the principal cases above referred to. The
New York court has meanwhile modified its position very materially
in holding that materialmen under this same federal statute might share
in the dividend where they had instituted suit in the federal court prior
to the receivership, although such suit had not gone to judgment.5
"People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (Matter of Fleet v. Yawger) (1912) 205
N. Y. 135, 98 N. E. 412, Ann. Cas. I9I3D urSo. The decision that the claim was
contingent until judgment was obtaindd in the suit in which the bond was sub-
stituted for the attachment is obviously correct. Judgment was necessary to
settle the question whether there would be any claim.
"People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (Matter of Smith Co. v. Yawger) (1914)
211 N. Y. io7, 1o5 N. E. 99, three judges dissenting. The Act of Congress of
August 13, 1894, ch. 28o, amended by Act of February 24, i9o5, ch. 778, 33 Stat.
L. 811 ( U. S. Comp. St. I916, sec. 6923), provides that a contractor on govern-
ment works shall give the usual surety bond with the additional obligation that
he shall promptly pay all persons supplying labor or materials in the prosecution
of the work. The Act then provides for suit on this bond by such materialmen,
stating that the suit shall be brought in the federal court for the district in which
the contract was to be performed "and not elsewhere." The government may
bring suit within six months from the date of completion of the contract, during
which period no suit may be instituted by materialmen, though they may inter-
vene in any suit brought by the government. Only one action is to be brought,
all other claimants intervening in that action.
"Matter of Empire State Suiety Co. (915) 216 N. Y. 273, i1O N. E. 61o.
Two of the three judges who dissented here were with the majority of the
court in the case referred to in note 4, supra, but the complexion of the court
had changed in the meantime. The court attempts to distinguish the previous
decision on the ground that here claimants had instituted suit in the federal
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The principal cases, which are decisions in favor of claimants, do
not definitely settle the first question, namely within what time claims
must mature in order to share in the dividend. They seem to tend
toward the New York rule applied in the trial court and urged by the
receiver, inasmuch as they state the rule that claims must have matured
prior to the institution of receivership proceedings, but hold that the
claims in question had so matured.6 At most, the cases are only dicta
on this point and in the absence of any discussion it may still be con-
sidered open in Connecticut. The point deserves careful consideration.
While the New York Courts state the rule generally, it may there be
rested on the New York Statute.7 The bankruptcy rule is the same,
but there likewise it follows from the wording of the Bankruptcy Act.8
It has, however, been applied generally in many cases.9 For a time it
appeared to be the usual rule, but seems now to be losing in favor, due
in large measure to the forceful opinion of Judge Noyes for the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the New York City
Railway Receivership."0 Only recently the Supreme Court of the
court before the receivership, whereas in the previous decision no suit had been,
or could have been, instituted, six months not having elapsed since the completion
of the work. It is submitted that there is no real ground of distinction between
the cases. Either the form of remedy under the Statute is so far part of the
right created that the claim is contingent until judgment is obtained, or right
and remedy are distinct and the claim matures when the default or breach of
bond occurs. On the New York rule see also Matter of Empire State Surety
Company (1915) 2r4 N. Y. 553, io8 N. E. 825.
'So also in Bridgeport v. Aetna Indemnity Co. (1916) 9I Conn. i97, 99 AtI.
566. Cf. however, Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co. (1903) 76 Conn. :7, 40, 55At. 599.
'Art. VI of General Corporation Law of N. Y. An order is passed sequestra-
ting the property of the corporation and dissolving the corporation. The dis-
tribution takes place first among the creditors whose claims represent a fixed
liability at the time of the commencement of the action and the order of seques-
tration. People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (i916, N. Y.) 171 App. Div. i5,
i56 N. Y. Supp. 1027, 1139.
"Sec. 63 of the Bankruptcy Act; Re Pettingill (i9o5, D. Mass.) i37 Fed.
z43, 146; Re Neff (I9o7, C. C. A. 6th) 157 Fed. 57, 84 C. C. A. 561, 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 349; and cases cited notes io and ii infra.
'Attorney General v. Equitable Accident Ass'n (.goo) 175 Mass. 196, 55 N. E.
890 (applying statute); Lenoir v. Linville Imp. Co. (1900) 126 N. C. 922, 36
S. E. i85, 5i L. R. A. 146; Appeal of Dean (I889) 98 Pa. ioi; People v. Com-
mercial Alliance Life Ins. Co. (1896) 15o N. Y. 94, 45 N. E. 8; cases collected
in 23 R. C. L. io2 and in Ann. Cas. 1913D 1184.
"Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. (i912, C. C. A. 2d) 198 Fed.
721, 736. See page 741 of i98 Fed.: "It is not a light thing for a Chancery
Court acting without statutory direction to say that a creditor shall lose his
demand when he has not been at fault and when the settlement of the estate will
not be protracted by allowing it." The court points out that this is not incon-
sistent with the rule of cases like Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co. (1914)
88 Conn. x85, 2o6, 90 At. 369, that no interest is allowed upon claims after the
appointment of a receiver.
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United States, speaking through Mr. justice Holmes, has approved
Judge Noyes' opinion and held that receivers, in the absence of statu-
tory law, have no authority to give to the filing of the bill the effect of
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy so as to exclude a claim maturing
within a reasonable time befor6 distribution can be made.1 ' Here
claims which matured within the period allowed by the court for the
filing of claims were permitted to share in the dividend. Other cases
have suggested other and later periods within which claims should
mature to share in the dividend, notably within the period to the order
declaring the dividend, or within a period limited by special order of
court. 12
Advocates of the stricter rule say that theoretically the division of
the assets is made as of the date of the institution of proceedings. But
this is not an argument, and actually division is never made then and is
usually not made for some years thereafter. The entire question is one
of policy, not of logic; the real argument for the stricter rule is that
it is one of convenience, that a point of rest must be reached at some
time in order that the affairs of the insolvent corporation may be
wound up and its assets distributed, or else such proceedings can never
terminate, and that in order to hasten this time the period should be
set as far in advance as possible. In any event, so it is contended,
some deserving creditors must suffer for the benefit of the many, and
this early date is as fair as any which can be selected and is the most
desirable date from the administrative standpoint. But the difficulty
is that the date of institution of proceedings is not in the control of the
court, and, if not fixed by chance, may be fixed by the acts or con-
nivance of interested parties, either creditors or the debtor,-the parties
litigant-who thus juggle with the contractual relations of those claim-
ants whose contracts are still executory. Contractual relations should
not be fixed in such a haphazard manner."3 If they must be interfered
with at all by a court of equity, they should be fixed directly by the
court by its own order and in such manner as will make for as little
interference as is consistent with due expedition in liquidating the
property under the court's control. It is even doubtful if there would
be very great delay in settlement if the time when the dividend is
declared is to be taken as the point of rest, but certainly there will be
Wrin. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed (1918) 245 U. S. 597, 602, 38 Sup. Ct. 211.
See this case below in (i9,5, C. C. A. ist) :3o Fed. 31, 33. In accord see
In Re Ross & Son, Inc. (1915) io Del. Ch. 434, 95 Atl. 311.
2New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lombard Inv. Co. (1896, C. C. W.
D. Mo.) 73 Fed. 537; Hayes v. Scudder (1888) 32 Mo. App. 372.
" It may be said that as judgment may still be obtained against the debtor,
contractual relations are not interfered with. But the judgment is of no value
if the receiver holds all the debtor's assets. It may be that the primary relations
resulting from the contract are not interfered with. But the secondary rela-
tions which concern the enforcement of any judgment dealing with these
primary relations are interfered with.
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none if the point chosen is that of the time within which claims must
be filed. As the court will, for good cause shown, extend the time for
presenting claims so as to prevent all injustice,'4 it seems eminently
fair to take this as the point of rest. The stricter rule does shut out,
without statutory authority, many claims which, in all fairness, should
share in the dividend, without thereby hastening settlement of the
estate. The only gain under this rule is an increase in dividend to cer-
tain claimants at the expense of others fully as deserving. This is a
result which ought not to appeal to a court of equity.
The Connecticut court has, however, adopted an eminently fair rule
as to what are matured claims. In the first case under discussion the
court held that unpaid materialmen might, under the United States
Statute above referred to,15 share in the dividend to be paid by the
receivers of the surety on the contractor's bond, although judgment
was not obtained in the federal court until after the receiver's appoint-
ment in the state court. In the second case, where a principal in an
indemnity bond was in default prior to the receivership of the surety,
but the amount was not ascertained until judgment was thereafter
entered in a foreign jurisdiction, it was held that the claim was not
contingent, the court pointing out the well settled distinction between
claims which are really contingent and claims which have matured, but
where the amount of damages is unliquidated.
It is suggested that in reaching its decision in the first case the court
made more difficulty out of the situatidn than was necessary. The
court refers to the usual rule that a court controlling receivership pro-
ceedings may decide whether it shall determine for itself all claims of
or against a receiver, or will allow them to be litigated elsewhere, 8
but then states that this rule must give away in this case to the express
provisions of the Act of Congress creating the right and the remedy
and definitely naming the court, i. e. the federal court, in which the
remedy must be pursued. It therefore holds that the trial court was
" In Buzzell v. Aetna Indemnity Co. (1917) 91 Conn. 359, IOO Atl. 32, the
court held the matter of extension of time to be a question of discretion. For
liberal practice in extending the time for presenting claims to a receiver, see
London & S. & F. Bank v. Willamette Steam Mill L. & M. Co. (1897,
C. C. S. D. Cal.) 8o Fed. 226; Grinnell v. Merchants Insurance Co. (1863, Ch.)
16 N. J. Eq. 283; Pattberg v. Pattberg & Brothers (1897, Ch.) 55 N. J. Eq. 6o4,
38 Atl. 2o5; Wall v. Young (1895, Ch.) 54 N. J. Eq. 24, 33 Atl. 526; Richter v.
Merchants Natt. Bank (1896) 65 Minn. 237, 67 N. W. 995; Taylor v. Moore
(1897) 64 Ark. 23, 40 S. W. 258; Bank of Washington v. Creditors (1877) 8o
N. C. 9; McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Woltman (1894) 114 N. C. 178, i
S. E. iog; Eddy, Petitioner (1887) I5 R. I. 474, 8 Atl. 694.
" See note 4, supra.
"Porter v. Sabin (1893) 149 U. S. 473, 479, 13 Sup. Ct. 1OO8, 37 L. ed. i51,
157, 815; Attorney General v. American Legion of Honor (19o7) 196 Mass. 151,
157, 81 N. E. 966; Odell v. Batterman Co. (1915, C. C. A. 2d) 223 Fed. 298,
io8 C. C. A. 54o.
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powerless to determine the validity and amount of the liabilities of the
surety under this bond, and that the Congressional Act displaces pro
tanto the jurisdiction of the court appointing the receiver, though the
judgment itself does not affect the assets in the hands of the receiver
until it is presented to the court of the receivership and the judgment
creditor has intervened in the receivership action.
Obviously the receiver's assets are not affected by the judgment until
it is proved in the receivership proceedings. 1 Is such proof only a
matter of form, and must the court of the receivership accept the judg-
ment of the federal court? The decision seems so to hold. If the
remedy under the Statute is so far a part of the right created by the
Statute as this, it would seem they are altogether inseparable, so that
until the" remedy is followed, there is no right; or in other words, any
claim under the statute remains contingent until judgment is obtained.1 8
Under the equitable rule allowing claims to mature after the institu-
tion of the receivership proceedings, such claim would still not neces-
sarily be barred from sharing in the dividend. But is not the Connect-
icut court, under its own construction of the Federal Act, in reality here
allowing a claim which was contingent at the date of the receivership?
But it is submitted that the true construction of the Federal Act is
that the requirement as to the place of suit is merely a restriction on
the remedy,-on the adjective relations, as distinguished from the sub-
stantive relations, arising under the Statute-which a court of equity
in settling the affairs of an insolvent corporation need not require.19
A court of equity which has taken possession of the affairs of a cor-
poration for purposes of liquidation should, for reasons of adminis-
trative convenience at least, have the power, as it admittedly has in
all ordinary cases, to decide the manner and place where claims shall
be adjusted. Why should it not have that power in this case? Is it
so hampered that it cannot recognize statutory causes of action, only
judgments?" It is submitted that the court of the receivership not
only may, but should, recognize statutory causes of action, though in
this extraordinary proceeding it should not be hampered by the restric-
'T U. S. v. Illinois Surety Co. (1917, E. D. N. C.) 238 Fed. 840, 846.
This was the theory of the court in People v. Metropolitan Surety Co.
(1914) 211 N. Y. io7, 1o5 N. E. 99; supra, note 4.
"'This was the theory of the dissenting judges in People v. Metropolitan Surety
Co., supra, note 4: "There is a vital distinction between a condition of liability
and a conditioxr of the enforcement of that liability."
o Compare the decisions of which Flash v. Cogtnecticut (1883) iog U. S. 371,
3 Sup. Ct 263, is an example, that where the statutory liability of one is sub-
ject to the condition precedent of an unsatisfied judgment against another, per-
formance of this condition is rendered unnecessary by the other's bankruptcy.
In Blair v. St. Louis H. & K. R. (1884, C. C. E. D. Mo.) 19 Fed. 861 the court
of the receivership permitted persons claiming statutory liens to file them with
the receiver with the same force and effect as if filed respectively in the state
courts.
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tions placed upon the enforcement of such causes by means of suit in
ordinary litigation. In making its equitable distribution it should
recognize substantive relations, whether arising under statute or other-
wise, while the manner in which it is proceeding would make it unnec-
essary that it follow restrictions on adjective relations.
This discussion leads directly to the question whether claims
founded on executory contracts of the insolvent, 21 unfulfilled by the
receiver, are provable. Clearly a receiver acting for the benefit of all
creditors may find an executory contract so burdensome that he should
not carry it out. May he refuse to complete it so that the obligee is
without redress against the insolvent's property? Many cases so
hold.22  In a leading case23 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
has urged that the "privilege" 24 of the receiver to refuse to carry out
a burdensome contract would be a barren privilege if the claimant
could then prove his claim for the breach. Yet his power of refusal
may even then not be entirely barren; and as a matter of equity and
fair dealing why should he have a privilege of refusal which will
deprive the obligee of his contract merely to enrich other creditors?
Moreover, by what law does a court of equity obtain authority thus in
reality, if not in form, to impair the obligation of contracts ?25 It is
submitted that as a matter of justice, as well as law, the individual
should not be sacrificed to add a few dollars to the dividend of the
many.28
2 The word "insolvent!' is used advisedly, since no dispute as to liability arises
if the estate ultimately proves solvent or more than sufficient to pay other
creditors. See Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., note 6, supra; cf. note 13, supra.
'People v. Globe Mut. Life Insurance Co. (1883) 9i N. Y. 174; Lenoir v.
Linville Imp. Co. (x9oo) 126 N. C. 922, 36 S. E. 185; Law v. Waldron (I9x)
23o Pa. 458, 79 Atl. 647; Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., supra; 34 Cyc. 258,
264. If the receiver does adopt the contract he must take the burdens with the
benefits. Butterworth v. Degnan Construction Co. (1913, S. D. N. Y.) 2o8 Fed.
381; Eames v. Claflin Co. (915, S. D. N. Y.), 22o Fed. i9o; Atchison T. & S.
R..R. v. Hurley (19o7, C. C. A. 8th) 153 Fed. 503; Eaton v. Houston & T. C.
R. R. (i889, C. C. E. D. Tex.) 38 Fed. 784; Spencer v. World's Col. Exposition
(i896) 163 Ill. 117, 45 N. E. 25o; Worthington v. Park Improvement Co. (1896)
ioo Ia. 39, 69 N. W. 258; Commercial Publishing Co. v. Beckwith (igoi) 167
N. Y. 329, 332, 6o N. E. 642; Kuebler v. Haines (igio) 229 Pa. 274, 78 At. 141.
Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., supra.
24"Privilege" is hardly the correct term, inasmuch as the very question for
decision by the court was whether the receiver had a privilege. The expression
should have been "power" here. The court does ultimately hold that there
is a privilege. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913) 23 YALE
LAW JouRNAL, i; (1917) 26 ibid. 710; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, etc. (1917)
26 ibid. 186 ff.
Cf. note 13, supra.
So held in Spader v. Mural Dec. Mfg. Co. (189o) 47 N. J. Eq. 18, 20 At.
378; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. IV. Y. City Ry. (1912 C. C. A. 2d) I98 Fed. 721,
740; Rosenbaum v. Credit System Co. (1898) 6x N. J. L. 543, 40 At. 59i;
McLean Sons Co. v. Butler & Co. (1914, D. C. Mass.) 208 Fed. 730; Howe v.
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It is held under the Bankruptcy Act that the appointment of a
receiver over a corporation by a state court constitutes a breach of the
corporation's executory contracts, so that the obligees under such
contracts may prove their claims against the corporation if it later
goes into bankruptcy.2 7 This seems entirely proper and would lead
to this: that where the receiver may repudiate executory contracts of
the insolvent corporation over which he is receiver, these obligees
should thereafter, where permitted by the Bankruptcy Act, take meas-
ures to force the corporation into bankruptcy and thus share in the
corporation's assets. In other words, this rule would naturally and
properly have the effect of ousting the state court of jurisdiction.
It would seem that the true end to be sought in the settlement of an
estate by receivers is the distribution of the assets, so far as consistent
with a reasonably prompt settlement, aniong all those who have actual
claims against the insolvent, and that it is not to shut out as many of
such creditors as possible in order that the remaining creditors should
receive an increased dividend. 2  Hence the principal cases are com-
mendable as tending towards such equitable distribution.
EFFECT OF WAR ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
A recent decision of the House of Lords, Rodriguez v. Speyer
Brothers (1918) 119 L. T. Rep. 4o9, raises a new aspect of the rule
denying non-resident alien enemies the privilege of suing in municipal
courts during the war. In that case, a partnership of six persons, of
whom five were British and one a German residing in Germany-the
partnership on the outbreak of the war being thereby dissolved-
brought an action in the liquidation proceedings to recover a pre-war
debt due the firm. All the partners being joined as co-plaintiffs, the
Hardy (890) 76 Tex. 17, 13 S. W. 41, 18 Am. St. Rep. 17. Thus in Spader v.
Mural Dec. Mfg. Co., supra, it is said by the court: "Natural justice demands
that those who suffered from breaches of contract should be included in the
distribution, even though the breaches and consequent damages follow the
insolvency." Cf. also Tiffen Glass Co. v. Stoehr (1896) 54 Oh. St. 157, 43 N. E.
-79: Yelland's Case (1867, Wood, V. C.) L. R. 4 Eq. 350; Ex parte Clark
(1869, James, V. C.) L. R. 7 Eq. 550; Ex parte Logan (187o, Romilly, M. R.)
L. R. 9 Eq. 149; In re Dale & Plant, Ltd. (188% Kay, J.) L. R. 43 Ch. D. 255;
it re Newdigate Col. Ltd. [191ml i Ch. 468. Some of the cases attempt to dis-
tinguish between voluntary and involuntary receiverships, basing the distinction
on the point whether or not the corporation admitted insolvency and joined in
the prayer for the appointment of a receiver It is then suggested that such
claims are provable when the receivership is voluntary and not when it is
involuntary. There seems to be no sound reason for this distinction. In re Ross
& Son, Inc. (915, Del. Ch.) 95 At. 311, 314.
'In re Mullings Clothing Co. (1916, C. C. A. 2d) 238 Fed. 58.
See People ex rel Attorney General v. Security Life Ins. Co. (1879) 79
N. Y. 267, 271, that the receiver is not to advocate the cause of one claimant
against another.
